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1. Introduction  
 
I am grateful for the opportunity to comment on Patrick Bondy’s ‘Bias in Legitimate Ad 
Hominem Arguments’. It is a rich paper with much to discuss and I will only be able to touch on 
a few of the ideas it provokes.  
 
2. Definitions  
 
Bondy begins with definitions and so shall I. He offers ‘a stipulative definition of “ad hominem 
argument”: these are cases where a speaker puts forward an argument, and a respondent replies 
(and here is the ad hominem) by pointing out a feature of the speaker’s character or 
circumstances, which the respondent takes (or purports to take) to be relevant to the speaker’s 
credibility or standing in the circumstances’ (Bondy 2017, p. 1). This excludes some varieties of 
ad hominem, although not the most familiar. More notably, it includes some varieties of 
argument not always classified as ad hominem, specifically arguments that turn on positive 
features of the speaker’s character, which are sometimes termed positive ethotic argument. While 
Bondy’s definition of ad hominem is somewhat wider than most, his definition of bias is 
somewhat narrower. He asserts that ‘“bias” applies when we judge a person, group of people, or 
institution, according to a comparatively very harsh or very easy standard’ (Bondy 2017, p. 1). 
Again, this is familiar, but it focuses on bias in the sense of prejudice, and excludes bias against 
objects other than people. Thus it is distinct from the sense that bias has, for example, in the 
‘biases and heuristics’ programme of cognitive psychology. 
 In discussing which instances of ad hominem may be legitimate, Bondy distinguishes 
cases where ‘we judge that it’s not rational for us to accept the premises’, from cases where ‘we 
might yet have good reason to reject its conclusion’, and cases where ‘we judge that the 
inferential support that the premises offer is not adequate’ (Bondy 2017, p. 2). These correspond, 
naturally enough, to ‘three ways of attacking an argument: attacking a premise, a conclusion and 
an inference’, what many scholars have identified as ‘three corresponding kinds of defeat: 
undermining, rebutting and undercutting’ (Prakken 2010, p. 94). However, Bondy maintains that 
only the first of these, undermining, can give rise to legitimate ad hominem attacks. He tells us 
that ‘for the purpose of articulating criteria for evaluating individual arguments, [rebuttal] can be 
set aside’ (Bondy 2017, p. 2). And he refers us to an earlier paper for an argument that ad 
hominem undercutting is never legitimate (Bondy 2015). I have been less conservative in 
ascribing legitimacy to some cases of ad hominem, admitting all three varieties of defeat 
(Aberdein 2014). However, in these remarks I shall largely follow Bondy in concentrating on the 
legitimacy of ad hominem undermining. 
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3. Unjustified Biases 
 
Bondy’s present concern is with the relationship between bias and ad hominem arguments. He 
argues that the relationship is of this form: ‘it’s never the case that unjustified biases give rise to 
acceptable ad hominem responses to arguments. Ad hominems based on unjustified biases will 
always violate the rational acceptability condition on good arguments’ (Bondy 2017, p. 5). 
Ostensibly, this prohibition seems to be at odds with a virtue-based account of the legitimacy of 
ad hominem arguments defended independently by Heather Battaly, Christopher Johnson, and 
me. Bondy’s position might be reconciled with Johnson’s contention that ‘the stronger or more 
coherent the character portrait that develops from consideration of these virtues and traits, the 
more compelling the ad hominem appeal, and the less the objection of ad hominem fallacy, in 
making a decision between arguments’ (Johnson 2009, p. 265). Perhaps a strong and coherent 
character portrait requires sufficient attention to the subject’s character as to eliminate bias, or at 
least ensure that no unjustified biases endure. 
 However, Battaly writes ‘Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s 
intellectual character are legitimate. These arguments attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of 
reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform intellectually 
virtuous acts’ (Battaly 2010, p. 388). And I maintain that ‘negative ethotic argument is a 
legitimate move precisely when it is used to draw attention to argumentational vice. (Similarly, 
positive ethotic argument would be legitimate precisely when it referred to argumentational 
virtue.) For example, highlighting instances of bias, conflict of interest, or deception would be 
legitimate. Seeking to discredit one’s opponent by focusing on his non-argumentational vices, or 
behaviour that is not vicious at all, would be illegitimate’ (Aberdein 2010, p. 171). Hence both 
Battaly and I are committed to the position that it is sufficient for the legitimacy of an ad 
hominem attack that the arguer whose argument is under attack is attacked for argumentational 
vices that they truly possess. But, for Bondy, an ad hominem attack that arises from the 
unjustified biases of the attacker is never legitimate. So, ad hominem attacks on actual 
argumentational vice that arise from unjustified biases would be legitimate for Battaly and me 
but illegitimate for Bondy. Can there be such attacks, and how should they be judged?  
 Suppose I develop a violent and irrational prejudice against politicians with combovers. 
Such a bias may lead me to focus a close critical attention on the arguments advanced by such 
individuals, thereby leading to my discovery of the argumentational vices of a certain 
presidential candidate, vices I might otherwise have overlooked. My bias is unjustified, but it has 
led me to believe something true: that the candidate is argumentationally vicious. For Bondy, the 
origins of my discovery would seem to disqualify my use of it in argument as illegitimate. On 
my account, the origin is immaterial: if the vices are real, they are fair game. 
 In reply, Bondy might say that in this case I have acquired independent justification for 
my ascription of argumentational vice, such that my ad hominem is no longer based on 
unjustified bias, at least directly. But consider a variation: my bias leads me to maintain that all 
politicians with combovers are untrustworthy. (‘The scoundrels won’t even admit to being 
bald!’) I therefore attack the candidate as untrustworthy, accurately as it happens, but before I 
have any direct evidence for this judgment. Or, with apologies to Patricia Highsmith, consider 
the following variation on Bondy’s Ripley example. Suppose that Marge really is a terrible 
arguer, who routinely overestimates the strength of her evidence. But Dickey’s father comes to 
believe this of her solely on the grounds of his bias against women as arguers.  
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 Both of these examples exhibit pretty dreadful argumentation. Both arguers would be 
vulnerable to a subsequent legitimate ad hominem counterattack drawing attention to their 
argumentational vices. But it does not follow that they are guilty of illegitimate ad hominem 
themselves—there are many ways of arguing dreadfully! Nonetheless, Bondy would seem 
committed to identifying these cases as illegitimate ad hominem. Moreover, he would seem 
committed to identifying outwardly similar cases in which the arguers had obtained the available 
justification for their specific bias as legitimate ad hominem. If I’m right about this, Bondy’s 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem would seem to turn on the success of 
a process of justification that may be entirely internal to the arguer.  
 
4. Bias-Driven Scepticism 
 
Bondy draws attention to Audrey Yap’s work on the long-term effects of ad hominems based on 
unjustified biases (Yap 2013, 2015). As he summarizes this work, ‘unjustified negative biases 
can damage a speaker’s rhetorical credibility, even when the bias is made explicit and everyone 
recognizes that it’s an unjustified bias’ (Bondy 2017, p. 6). He generalizes this point to include 
the unearned benefits of unjustified positive biases. These considerations lead to broader 
sceptical implications, analogous to those raised by other authors in a related context (Saul 2013; 
Carter and Pritchard 2017). 
 Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard taxonomize bias-driven scepticism about knowledge 
as follows, distinguishing between three positions of increasing severity: weak bias-driven 
scepticism states that, since beliefs that turn out to depend essentially on bias cannot be 
knowledge, ‘we know a lot less than we hitherto supposed’; intermediate bias-driven scepticism 
states that true beliefs that result from the exercise of epistemic virtues, but also inessentially 
depend on bias, are not knowledge; strong bias-driven scepticism states that ‘even when true 
beliefs in the relevant domain are not infected by cognitive bias, since we are unable to rationally 
exclude the possibility that cognitive bias is present, it nonetheless follows that we lack 
knowledge’ (Carter and Pritchard 2017, p. 9). All three positions have argumentational 
counterparts. Weak bias-driven scepticism is the thesis that some arguments we have taken to be 
good are actually bad, since they rely essentially on bias. This sort of concern is widespread. 
Intermediate bias-driven scepticism is the thesis that some arguments we have taken to be good 
are actually bad, since they rely on bias, albeit inessentially. If I read Bondy correctly, then he is 
committed to this sort of scepticism too. And strong bias-driven scepticism is the thesis that 
some arguments we have taken to be good are actually bad, because even though they are in fact 
free from bias, we are unable to rationally exclude the possibility that it is present. The 
considerations that Bondy derives from Yap seem to lead to strong bias-driven scepticism as 
well. If illegitimate ad hominem arguments can have an effect on our judgment even after they 
have been exposed as illegitimate, then we would seem to be often in a position where we are 
unable to rationally exclude the possibility that our assessment of arguments has been coloured 
by bias despite our best efforts—even when our best efforts have actually succeeded. 
 
5. Magical Thinking 
 
Bondy seeks to explain this persistency of bias by analogy with ‘magical thinking’. As he notes, 
this is a phenomenon that has been studied in social psychology whereby beliefs known to 
contradict laws of nature still prove oddly incorrigible (Tykocinski 2008; Wolferen et al. 2013). 
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For example, ‘people will tend to refuse to eat chocolate if it’s shaped like dog feces, or like a 
cockroach, even if they know that it’s pure chocolate’ (Bondy 2017, p. 7). (Pedantically, 
Bondy’s examples might be better termed ‘quasi-magical thinking’, following Eldar Shafir and 
Amos Tversky, since they include cases in which people act as if they had magical beliefs that 
they do not really hold (Shafir and Tversky 1992, p. 716).) 
 A natural way to approach the phenomenon of (quasi-)magical thinking is via a dual-
process theory of rationality. Such an approach standardly distinguishes ‘System 1 [which] is 
fast, heuristic, associative, evolutionarily old, and automatic while System 2 is slow, serial, rule-
based, evolutionarily new, and controlled’ (Mugg 2016, p. 300). The disgust reaction, and 
thereby the aversion to eating things that trigger it, would be examples of a System 1 process, 
something that is largely unconscious. The knowledge that the specific item is actually good to 
eat would be an example of a System 2 process, something that is largely conscious. Indeed, 
dual-process theory has been applied to magical thinking (Arad 2014, p. 18). There are some 
grounds for scepticism about the empirical adequacy of dual-process theories (Mugg 2016). 
Nonetheless, dual-process theories have been successfully applied to argumentation (Bisquert 
et al. 2015; Godden 2015). Hence, Bondy’s employment of magical thinking as an analogy for 
bias suggests that his approach may be assimilated to a broader dual-process account of bias. But 
that is not to deny the value of this analogy. On the contrary, it may provide the basis for 
optimism about the possibility of successful debiasing on a dual-process account. For magical 
thinking is something that can be overcome.  
 Bondy insists that ‘I would eat a piece of inferior chocolate that’s shaped in a normal way 
before I would eat an excellent piece of chocolate shaped like a cockroach’ (Bondy 2017, p. 7). 
That’s his call, of course, and he’s not alone in his preferences. But he may be in a minority, as 
sales of gummy worms and, indeed, cockroach-shaped chocolates may suggest (Schaffler 2015). 
For a more savoury example, consider the oyster. The seventeenth-century author Thomas Fuller 
tells us that ‘King James was wont to say, “He was a very valiant man who first adventured on 
eating of oysters.” Most probably mere hunger put men first on that trial … famine making men 
to find out those things which afterwards proved not only wholesome, but delicious’ (Fuller 
1662, vol. 1, p. 493). When we first see an oyster, System 1 tells us pretty strongly that this is not 
something we should put in our mouths. But, if once System 2 gets the upper hand, then we can 
train ourselves out of that initial response.  
 Magical thinking seems to persist in cases where it carries little cost—going a little bit 
out of one’s way to buy a lottery ticket or settling for inferior chocolate. Likewise, biases often 
carry little immediate cost for the biased. In neither case is there much incentive to revisit one’s 
careless habits of mind. But it does not follow that such habits are incorrigible. Indeed, as the 
oyster story suggests, once suitably incentivized, one’s preferences can be diametrically 
reversed. 
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